The Supreme Court Upholds Iron Curtains, P. 4

The Prize Remark of the Dominican Crisis

"In reply to a question based on a statement made yesterday by former President Juan Bosch that his government —if it came back—would not be Communist, Mr. Harriman responded: 'The United States takes no part in the political decision of the Dominican people in the selection of their leadership'."

—From Bogota, Colombia, where Harriman, as President Johnson's Ambassador at Large, stopped over on his tour to drum up Latin American support for U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, New York Times May 3.

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The Fatal Lure of World Dominion

The Department of Commerce publishes a daily bulletin in which the government advertises various wants for bidding. There in the issue of April 29, as our Marines were landing in Santo Domingo, appeared an ad which deserves to be preserved for the historian. Amid requests for bids on tires, spare aircraft parts and survival kits, was this item—

Service and materials to perform a RESEARCH STUDY ENTITLED 'PAX AMERICANA' [capitals in original] consisting of a phased study of the following: (a) elements of National Power; (b) Ability of selected nations to apply the elements of National Power; (c) A variety of world power configurations to be used as a basis for the U.S. to maintain world hegemony in the future. Quotations and applicable specifications will be available upon request, at the Army Research Office, 3845 Columbia Pike, Arlington, Va., until 1 May 1965.

Military Taking Over The State Dept.

What better time to study the problem of maintaining American world hegemony than the moment when our combat troops were going ashore in Vietnam on the South China sea in one hemisphere and in the Caribbean in the other? Coupled with this ad were three others from the Army. One was a study of the foreign aid programs of the West European nations. The second was "U.S. Involvement in the Emerging Nations," a study "to determine the quality and quantity of total U.S. presence and influence in Latin America, Africa and Asia, to identify salient trends and to project the latter into the 1975-1980 time frame." The third was the most disturbing, "Investigation of the feasibility and desirability in the 1970 time frame, of providing selected U.S. allies a significant nuclear defense capability *without necessity for maintaining U.S. controls or custody over weapons systems or their employment.*" (Our italics). These contracts provide an insight into what is going on within our military bureaucracy, the extent to which it is invading the State Department's province in making foreign policy, and the kind of foreign policy the armed forces project for the future—one in which they play policemen to the world, even handing out nuclear weapons to favored allies in the task! This is a formula which can only end by spilling the blood of our best youth in an endless attempt to dominate the planet. This is in the background of Johnson's increasingly militaristic policy in Asia and Latin America. Like Bismarck, we are resorting to blood and iron.

Glimpses of the Truth

"A U.S. Peace Corps worker, who asked not to be identified, said there seemed to be wide countryside support for the revolution to return Bosch to power. He said the more than 100 U.S. Peace Corps volunteers in the Dominican Republic were safe and in no danger, even in Santo Domingo."

—AP from Santo Domingo in Washington Post *May 3*

"Diplomatic sources said the rebels promised to do their best to make the cease-fire effective. So far they appear to have done so. There was little shooting here today by either of the opposing forces. Some diplomats point to this as indicating the pro-Bosch but anti-Communist military leaders have greater control of the rebel movement than many observers here had supposed. U.S. officials who claimed the Communists now dominate the rebel movement, declined to explain the ability of the rebel military leaders to achieve a cease-fire, except to say that apparent Communist obedience was simply a matter of Red 'tactics'."

—Dan Kurzman, Washington Post *staff man from Santo Domingo in that newspaper same day.*

Two of Kennedy's utterances come to mind as one watches the steady degeneration of policy under Johnson. One was in Kennedy's American University speech in June, 1963, "What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek? Not a *Pax Americana* enforced on the world by American weapons of war." The other was at the University of California that year when Kennedy warned, "We must reject oversimplified theories of international life—the theory that American power is unlimited, or that the American mission is to remake the world in the American image." Such views are now out of fashion. They are stigmatized as neo-isolationist while ultra-nationalist ambition parades as internationalist idealism.

All kinds of excuses could be made for Johnson's Vietnam policy. He inherited the war from Kennedy. He needed a position of strength from which to negotiate. But the Dominican affair and the "Johnson Doctrine" put Vietnam in a different light. For what Johnson is saying is that despite the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization

(Continued on Page Two)

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of American States we arrogate to ourselves the right to intervene whenever and wherever we believe a Communist regime may take over. This doctrine has two deplorable consequences. Like the Vietnamese war it must tend to solidify the Communist bloc just when centrifugal forces had made an appearance within it; American policy in Europe under Eisenhower and Kennedy had begun to encourage independence within the bloc by treating each European (though not Asian) Communist regime differently. Now that different types of Communism have begun to appear, and with them liberalizing trends, we enunciate a doctrine that no longer distinguishes among them. The effect may be to risk a new Stalinist Ice Age in the bloc as its members draw together again in fear of the U.S.

McCarthyism In Foreign Policy

The implications are also serious for the non-Communist world. Social reform movements and anti-military uprisings in Latin America and elsewhere will be at the mercy of American definitions of what constitutes Communism. The Johnson Doctrine is McCarthyism in foreign policy. Like McCarthyism at home, it faces the same basic dilemma and that is to determine who is a Communist. Foreign policy generally tends to be to the right of domestic policy; the familiar accusation of Communism was unable to block the New Deal and the Fair Deal at home when popular feeling and democratic institutions overrode rightist propaganda in the press and communications generally. But in foreign policy, where popular feeling rarely registers, we often tend to regard with suspicion in Latin America regimes which are no more Leftist than was FDR's. This is why countries like Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Mexico—all non-Communist regimes—look with suspicion on our Dominican intervention. The sources on which the government depends in foreign policy decisions are all heavily weighted against the non-Communist reformer. Big business, the military, the intelligence apparatus and the Foreign Service tend to share the views of their opposite numbers in the countries with which we deal, and in Latin America these sectors of society are even further right than in our own. To this influence must be added that of the Catholic Church. Cardinal Spellman—himself a major factor in U.S. foreign policy—was long a pillar of both the Diem regime in South Vietnam and the

Bosch Accuses The U.S.

Mr. [Robert] PIERPONT (CBS News): Mr. Bosch, do you support the presence of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic?

Sr. [Juan] BOSCH (deposed President of the Dominican Republic): No, sir. As you or other Americans could not support the presence of foreign troops in your country. . . .

Mr. PIERPONT: Do your people there feel and report to you that American troops are supporting General Wessin y Wessin and opposing your return? . . .

Sr. BOSCH: When infantry landed in San Isidro they found Wessin y Wessin was defeated. . . .

Mr. [Richard] HOTTELET (CBS News): Are you saying, Mr. Bosch, the U.S. has invaded the Dominican Republic and is changing the course of the revolution?

Sr. BOSCH: Of course, of course. . . .

Mr. PIERPONT: Mr. Bosch, you said that you have asked your forces in Santo Domingo not to fire on Americans. Are they following their orders?

Sr. BOSCH: Not absolutely. It was impossible because American Marines have shot Dominicans and they are going into the city, the old city, firing, in the first moment firing into the air and firing into the ground, not exactly at persons but they are going to disarm people who walk in the streets and so they are going to kill people and people are going to kill them.

Mr. PIERPONT: Are you saying the American forces began the killing then?

Sr. BOSCH: Yes, sir. . . .

Mr. PIERPONT: Does this mean, in your opinion, the cease-fire has broken down completely?

Sr. BOSCH: Yes. It was broken by American Marines.

—Juan Bosch on CBS Face The Nation, May 2.

How the Anti-Castro Obsession Undercut JKF's Program for Latin Social Reform

"However enthusiastic Kennedy's New Frontiersmen were in behalf of counterinsurgency . . . they did not convince the Latin American military leaders that this was the best way to fight Communism. The Administration's thesis that Castro's success was due to guerrilla-warfare techniques, unbeatable by the use of conventional arms, was not accepted. Instead, the Latin American generals . . . demanded tremendous amounts of new equipment—tanks, jets, destroyers—to defend their own country. The military, particularly those of Brazil and Venezuela, took advantage of the October, 1962, missile crisis to double and triple their demands for heavy military hardware. . . .

"Latin America's armed forces were willing to cooperate with the U.S. anti-guerrilla training missions and to devote a unit or two of their establishments to anti-guerrilla warfare operations but . . . the counter-insurgency units did not always perform as intended. In Peru, the anti-guerrilla commandos spearheaded the ouster of President Manuel Prado. In the Dominican Republic, the U.S. trained police joined the Army in ousting President Bosch, following which both the police and the anti-guerrilla units, trained during 1963 by a 44-man U.S. Army Mission, were used to hunt down Bosch's non-Communist partisans in the name of anti-Communism. In Guatemala and Ecuador, too, there was every indication that the counter-insurgency forces, both the police and Army units, were being used principally to stifle the political thrust of the non-Communist left. . . . which Washington [under Kennedy] believed to be the best defense against Communism. . . .

"The [Kennedy] Administration's policies were not always consistent. Its general policy was to encourage the growth of responsible apolitical military organizations so that democracy might have a better chance to function; yet, when it wanted to isolate Cuba, it did not hesitate to make political use of the military against policies of the civilian governments of Argentina and Ecuador. Also, it compromised democratic principles for the sake of expediency in accepting the coups of Guatemala and Ecuador. Finally, it began to veer toward a watered-down definition of democracy by going along with vetoes issued by the military against majority-supported civilian politicians. . . .

"As military intervention in many countries blocked democratic social revolution, it gave added weight to Castro's oft-repeated assertion that there is no alternative between violent social upheavals and military dictatorship. And it was certainly true that, despite its noble efforts and intentions, the Kennedy Administration accomplished little in furthering the cause of democracy in Latin America."

—Edwin Lieuwen: Generals vs. Presidents—Neo Militarism in Latin America (Praeger, 1964) highly recommended.

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Trujillo dictatorship in the Dominican Republic. If such forces decide who is Communist, then social reform in the hemisphere and elsewhere is indeed in trouble.

Kennedy Supported Bosch

Here we come to a sharp difference between the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. The former was friendly to Bosch but Standard Oil of New Jersey was hostile to him, as was (to its shame) the AFL-CIO. While our Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, warned the Dominican military against a coup to unseat Bosch, his warnings were undercut by our Military Mission in the island, some of whose members agreed that Bosch was a Communist. The Catholic Church, which had opposed Bosch's election, was angered by the adoption of a secular Constitution. So after seven months, the first freely elected Dominican regime in a generation was overthrown. Bosch was all we claimed we wanted: a truly democratic social reformer absolutely free from any taint of Communism, as his friends Betancourt of Venezuela and Figueres of Costa Rica and our own Norman Thomas were prepared to attest. I was in the Dominican Republic when Bosch was in power, and I was impressed by his inspiring eloquence, his devotion and his uncompromising civil libertarian principles. But for the military and big business and the CIA to be a genuine liberal was by definition to be "soft on Communism." Kennedy, to his credit, shut off all aid to the new military regime after Bosch was overthrown and refused to recognize it. Only the military dictatorships of Spain, Portugal, Formosa and Honduras extended recognition in the month after the coup, while the U.S. held off. But Johnson, soon after Kennedy's assassination, reversed that policy. The reader can see from the box at the bottom of this page that Johnson, with Tom Mann, swung away from the social reform emphasis of the Alliance for Progress and toward military dictatorships submissive to American business interests—like Brazil's which Rusk hailed as a victory for democracy and constitutional government!

There is no country for which U.S. intervention has a grimmer meaning than the Dominican Republic. The long and bloody night of the Trujillo dictatorship was ushered in by a similar U.S. Marine occupation. That Caribbean Nero was himself trained by the Marines, later armed by U.S. military aid, and praised by our Eastlands and Ellenders and McCormacks during the terrible years he imposed upon his people. The cry of Communism is familiar to them; for 30 years every opponent of The Benefactor was labelled a Communist. "I beg President Johnson and the American people," Mrs. Juan Bosch, herself a Cuban aristocrat, said at an anguished press conference here, "to understand that we are your friends. We are not 'rebels.' We are democrats fighting to *regain* the liberties which were stolen from us by Gen. Wessin. We need your help and understanding, not your paratroopers . . . not your bullets." Never was the Red Menace more fraudulently trotted out than against Bosch and his supporters. Every American who knows what such interventions have cost the Latins in the past must blush with shame over Johnson's revival of gunboat diplomacy.

Just One Big Plot From One Big Switchboard

Mr. Rowland EVANS: Senator Dodd, you just said you are very sure there is a connection between events in the Dominican Republic and the fighting in Vietnam. Would you document that a little bit? Do you mean there is a central command post somewhere, perhaps in Peking, that is signalling an outbreak of trouble in the Caribbean at a specific time to embarrass President Johnson and the United States?

Senator DODD: Yes, I do. . . . I am satisfied that this situation in the Dominican Republic is tied right into our struggle in Southeast Asia.

—On Meet the Press, May 2.

How Johnson and Tom Mann Shifted the Emphasis from Reform to Anti-Communism

"Since his very first days in office, President Johnson has had to deal with the problem of militarism in Latin America. In the last two months of the Kennedy Administration, the U.S. boycott—diplomatic, economic and military—of the Dominican and Honduran regimes, as intended, seriously weakened the position of the military rulers in those two nations. But they soon came up with the magic formula for resisting demands to restore democracy and constitutionalism; it was the cry of Castro-Communism. Though Castro-Communism was never a serious problem when the democratic governments of Bosch and Villeda Morales were in power, the new military rulers repeatedly warned that Washington's ostracism of their regimes had given strength to subversive elements and that a Cuban-type upheaval was in store unless recognition and aid were granted. To this blackmail, the new Johnson Administration succumbed. On Dec. 14, 1963, in exchange for assurances that some kind of elections would be held during 1965, the juntas in the Dominican Republic and Honduras were recognized. During January and February 1964, the economic and military aid programs were resumed.

"During March came further evidence that a basic policy shift was under way in Washington. On March 16, the third anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, President Johnson paid lip service to the U.S. continued devotion to the principles of economic development, social justice and human freedom for Latin America, but he made no mention of the principal internal impediments to freedom and social justice, namely, the military and the oligarchies. Instead he mentioned that the principal threat to the Alliance was from Communism and in unequivocal terms pledged that 'the full power of the U.S. is ready to assist any country where freedom is threatened by forces dictated from beyond the shores of the continent.'

"But two days later, on March 18 [1964], at a meeting of U.S. Ambassadors to Latin America, the new Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Thomas Mann, reportedly suggested that it was unwise for the U.S. to continue to become involved in internal threats to freedom in Latin America, since Kennedy's policies had demonstrated how fruitless it was for the U.S. to try to impose democracy upon Latin America. Mann urged that greater attention be paid to immediate national-security interests, such as protection of U.S. investments and resistance to Communism. He suggested a less passionate commitment to political freedom and social justice. The emerging 'Mann doctrine' seemed to be that henceforth the U.S. would no longer oppose military coups or rightist dictatorships. Thus, the new and much narrower criteria for recognizing and supporting new governments in Latin America seemed to be anti-Communism and security for foreign investments. Eliminated were the Kennedy foreign-policy dimensions of human freedom and social justice."

—Lieuwen: Generals vs. Presidents (Praeger, 1964)

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To Uphold The Cuban Travel Ban Is To Make Police State Law for the Hemisphere

A Supreme Court Decision To Match LBJ's Latin American Policy

It is most disappointing that Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan abandoned their liberal principles and made possible a 6-to-3 victory for reaction in the Zemel case. The issue was the State Department's power to erect Iron Curtains around countries of which it disapproves, in this case Cuba, and forbid travel to them. The Chief Justice's decision breathes the same Metternichian spirit as the Johnson messages on the Dominican Republic and can serve only to set a bad example for the Americas.

The Same Iron Curtain Logic

This is a hemispheric police state decision. "The U.S. and other members of the Organization of American States," the Supreme Court noted, "have determined that travel between Cuba and the other countries of the Western Hemisphere is an important element in the spread of subversion, and many have therefore undertaken measures to discourage such travel." But if conditions in Cuba are as repellent as our government says they are, what better way to expose them than to encourage more people to go and see for themselves? If, on the other hand, progress is being made under Castro, then our Iron Curtain has the same purpose as those of totalitarian regimes—to keep their people from seeing the truth about the outside world and the falsity of their own propaganda.

The Chief Justice recognizes queasily that "the Secretary of State's refusal to validate passports for Cuba renders less than wholly free the flow of information concerning that country." But he and the majority decline to accept the contention that this is an invasion of First Amendment rights. They fall back on the view that "the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international relations" justify the Executive in wielding greater authority on the world than on the domestic scene.

If travel can facilitate "the spread of subversion" so can the reading of dangerous books and periodicals. If the President can shut off travel to Cuba or China or North Vietnam, as he does under present travel restrictions, can he also shut off publications from those countries? Or publications at home he deems friendly to them? Where do you stop once you decide that First Amendment rights may be restricted for foreign policy reasons? The Communists are not the only ones to use "salami" tactics in cutting away basic rights.

Black, Douglas and Goldberg dissented. The views of the dissenters reflect a philosophy suddenly on the wane. If travel is to be barred to shut off Communist ideas, Douglas and Goldberg argued, we have to deal with more than Cuba. There are Communist regimes on every continent "and if we are to know them and understand them, we must mingle with them, as Pope John said." The dissenters pleaded that "keeping alive intellectual intercourse between opposing groups" has "perhaps never been more important than now."

The First Amendment, Douglas and Goldberg declared in words which recall Holmes and Brandeis, "presupposes a mature people, not afraid of ideas." That Amendment, they protest, "leaves no room for the official, whether truculent or benign, to say nay or yea because the ideas offend or please him, or because he believes some political objective is served by keeping the citizen at home or letting him go." The words begin to sound like the echo of a vanishing age.

Punished for Going to Cuba

The U.S. seems to think it has the right to control the travel to Cuba not only of its own citizens but of Latin Americans. On April 28 immigration authorities at Kennedy Field in New York took away the residence card of a respected Latin American Washington correspondent, Leopoldo Aragon, on his return from Mexico. He was told the action was taken "on suspicion of having been to Cuba"! Aragon writes for El Dia (Mexico), Ultima Hora (Santiago, Chile), Epoca (Montevideo) and Gestos (Lima). His visit to Cuba was no secret (his last previous visit there was in 1961) and he is to write a series on Cuba for his papers. This means writing with the threat of expulsion hanging over his head. Unless he obtains a new residence card, he and his family must pull up roots and leave the U.S. or face separation. Aragon's wife is a naturalized citizen. They have two American children. He is a Panamanian. We ask other papers to inquire and protest.

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